I am an assistant professor in philosophy at Seton Hall University. My primary areas of research are virtue ethics and moral psychology.

I work in the Aristotelian tradition. My research involves elaborating and elucidating Aristotle’s views on the virtues, developing accounts of individual virtues, and investigating the relationship between virtue and practical reasoning. Much of my work is informed by empirically-oriented research in psychology and cognitive science. My aim is to elaborate an empirically plausible moral psychology of neo-Aristotelian virtue.

“Beyond Silencing: Virtue, Subjective Construal, and Reasoning Practically,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.

In the contemporary philosophical literature, ideal virtue is often accused of setting a standard more appropriate for saints or gods than for human beings. In this paper, I undermine divinity-infused depictions of the fully virtuous, and argue that ideal virtue is, indeed, human. I focus on the virtuous person’s imperviousness to temptation, and contend that this imperviousness is not as psychologically implausible as it might seem. I argue that it is a virtuous person’s subjective construal of a situation that silences reasons in favour of acting contrary to virtue. That silencing, however, is not the whole story when it comes to their practical reasoning. Practical reasoning can, and often does, continue beyond silencing, particularly in the search for what Bernard Williams calls ‘constitutive solutions’. The upshot is a view of the virtuous as less god-like and more human—who will sometimes have to figure out what the virtuous response to a situation is, and who can still care deeply about the central concerns of human existence, including their life, health, loved ones, and life projects, even if those things will never provide them with a reason to act contrary to virtue.

“Virtue and Embodied Skill: Refining the Virtue-Skill Analogy,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 2021, 55(2): 251–268.

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The analogy between virtue and skill is well-known from the ancient Greek ethical tradition, and in Intelligent Virtue, Julia Annas makes a compelling case for its continued relevance to contemporary theory. Yet scant attention gets paid to the kind of skill to which virtue is most appropriately analogized. An insufficiently nuanced view of skill, I contend, renders the analogy less illuminating than it otherwise might be, and prevents virtue ethicists from making optimal use of the analogy. In this paper, I argue that embodied skill provides a particularly apt analogy for Aristotelian virtue in several important respects, and that it successfully captures the central features of Annas’ view while excluding skills that are problematically disanalogous to virtue. Moreover, I suggest that the refined analogy can help clarify some issues regarding deliberation, decision, and actions done on the spur of the moment.

“Virtuous Construal: In Defense of Silencing,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019, 5(2): 229-245.

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Over several articles, John McDowell sketches an analogy between virtue and perception, whereby the virtuous person sees situations in a distinctive way, a way that explains her virtuous behavior. Central to this view is his notion of silencing, a psychological phenomenon in which certain considerations fail to operate as reasons in a virtuous person’s practical reasoning. Despite its influence on many prominent virtue ethicists, McDowell’s ‘silencing view’ has been criticized as psychologically unrealistic. In this paper, I defend a silencing view of practical reasoning. I argue that the phenomenon of silencing has a narrower scope than is typically acknowledged. As a result, the view does not require the virtuous to be detached, unfeeling, or unpalatably stoic. Furthermore, I offer a psychologically plausible interpretation of McDowell’s claim that the virtuous see situations in a distinctive sort of way. The salient fact at which the virtuous arrive in their view of a situation should be understood, I argue, in terms of subjective construal.

“Aristotle’s Account of Courage,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2017, 34(4): 313–330.

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Aristotle’s account of courage in the Nicomachean Ethics leaves readers with several unresolved issues. In this paper, I draw out three: 1) questions regarding the scope of the virtue; 2) the extent to which, or even if, the courageous experience fear; and 3) if—and if so, how—Aristotle’s distinction between virtue and continence might hold in the case of courage. I argue that there are good reasons to extend the scope of courage beyond the battlefield and risk of life and limb, that Aristotle does not acknowledge the possibility that the courageous experience fear when exercising courage, and that the distinction between continence and virtue can, indeed, hold in the case of courage.

“Is Patience a Virtue?” Journal of Value Inquiry, 2017, 51(2): 327–340.

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‘Patience is a virtue,’ so the saying goes. But there are actually significant challenges to developing a neo-Aristotelian account of a virtue of patience. First, on an Aristotelian understanding, virtue is both instrumentally good and good in itself. Yet, with the exception of Christian ethics, a primarily—and often, exclusively—instrumental view of patience is pervasive in the philosophical literature. Can we provide a secular account of patience as not merely instrumentally valuable, but also valuable in itself? Furthermore, these instrumental views of patience make it seem more like a psychological skill than a virtue of character. But skills can be misused. If patience is to be a virtue, we need an account of it that entails goodness in its possessor. Finally, there is the challenge of specifying a field, or sphere of concern, for patience, especially given the wide diversity of phenomena that we tend to attribute to it. I propose a thin account of a virtue of patience that, I contend, can meet these challenges.

“Moral Judgments and Motivation: Making Sense of Mixed Intuitions,” Ethical Perspectives, 2016, 23(2): 209–230.

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This paper suggests an approach to the debate between motivational judgment internalism and motivational judgment externalism that can accommodate the fact that most individuals seem to hold a mix of internalist and externalist intuitions. Drawing on psychologist Augusto Blasi’s ‘self model,’ I contend that the notion of identity-based motivation can provide a straightforward story about moral judgments and motivation in a way that makes sense of our mix of intuitions. Despite not appearing to fit neatly under either internalism or externalism, the resulting view seems able to account for many of the longstanding concerns of the debate.

Employment

Assistant Professor in Philosophy
Seton Hall UniversityAug 2017–present

Adjunct Assistant Professor in Philosophy
Drew UniversityAug 2016–May 2017

Graduate Teaching Fellow in Philosophy
Brooklyn College, CUNYAug 2010–Dec 2012

Education

Ph.D., Philosophy, The Graduate Center, CUNY

Certificate in Women’s Studies, The Graduate Center, CUNY

M.A., Philosophy, University of Auckland

B.A., Philosophy, French, and English, Drew University

AOS

Virtue Ethics, Moral Psychology

AOC

Feminist Philosophy, Business Ethics, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Philosophy of Art

Publications

“Beyond Silencing: Virtue, Subjective Construal, and Reasoning Practically,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.

“Virtue and Embodied Skill: Refining the Virtue-Skill Analogy,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 2021, 55(2): 251–268.

“Virtuous Construal: In Defense of Silencing,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019, 5(2): 229–245.

“Aristotle’s Account of Courage,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2017, 34(4): 313–330.

“Is Patience a Virtue?” Journal of Value Inquiry, 2017, 51(2): 327–340.

“Moral Judgments and Motivation: Making Sense of Mixed Intuitions,” Ethical Perspectives, 2016, 23(2): 209–230.

Selected Presentations

“What to Do? Some Thoughts on Virtue & Reasoning Practically”
Northern Arizona University Philosophy Colloquium, Flagstaff, AZ, April 2019

“Beyond Silencing: From Salience to Action”
Australasian Association of Philosophy, Wellington, New Zealand, July 2018

“Virtue and Embodied Skill: Refining the Virtue-Skill Analogy”
Virtue, Skill, and Practical Reason Conference, Cape Town, South Africa, August 2017

“Is Patience a Virtue?”
Neglected Virtues: A Conference in Honour of Rosalind Hursthouse, Auckland, NZ, August 2015

“Finding Normativity in Subjective Construal”
Poster, APA Pacific Division, San Diego, CA, April 2014

“Moral Judgments and Identity-Based Motivation”
Australasian Association of Philosophy, Wollongong, Australia, July 2012

Selected Grants and Awards

2018 Summer Stipend, Seton Hall University Research Council

Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Mellon/American Council of Learned Societies

Dissertation Year Award, The Graduate Center, CUNY (declined for Mellon/ACLS)

Enhanced Chancellor’s Fellowship, The Graduate Center, CUNY

Courses taught at Seton Hall include:

Business Ethics
Ethics
Feminist Theories
Medieval Philosophy
Modern Society & Human Happiness
Philosophy & Gender

I have always been an educator at heart. I trained as a tap dancer in New York City while an undergraduate and taught tap for several years both during and after college. Before returning to graduate school, I taught high school English. I’ve also been a ski instructor, and still enjoy skiing in the Catskill Mountains.

I can be reached at denise.vigani@shu.edu.