Abstract. This present article suggests an approach to the debate between 
motivational judgment internalism and motivational judgment externalism that 
can accommodate the fact that most individuals seem to hold a mix of internalist 
and externalist intuitions. Drawing on psychologist Augusto Blasi’s ‘self model,’ 
I contend that the notion of identity-based motivation can provide a straight-
forward story about moral judgment and motivation in a way that makes sense 
of our mix of intuitions. Despite not appearing to fit neatly under either 
internalism or externalism, the resulting view seems able to account for many 
of the longstanding concerns of the debate.

Keywords. Moral motivation, motivational judgment internalism, moral iden-
tity, Augusto Blasi

I. Introduction

The debate between motivational judgment internalism (hereafter 
‘internalism’) and motivational judgment externalism (hereafter 
‘externalism’) focuses on whether a moral judgment is sufficient for moti-
vation, or if an additional conative state is required. It is clear from the 
literature that internalists and externalists have different intuitions regard-
ing moral judgment. Yet most individuals seem to hold a mix of internal-
ist and externalist intuitions (Björklund et al. 2012, 130). My aim in this 
article is to offer an approach to the issue that can account for this mix 
of intuitions. In particular, I suggest that a shift in focus from conative 
states to moral identity may be worthwhile. Drawing on psychologist 
Augusto Blasi’s ‘self model,’ I argue that the notion of identity-based 
motivation can provide a straightforward story about moral judgments 
and motivation that takes into account both our mix of intuitions as well
as many of the longstanding concerns of the debate between internalism
and externalism.

I begin by distinguishing different types of moral judgments. Acknowledging that not all of these different types of judgments may be
equally motivating is an important first step in making sense of our mixed
intuitions. I then introduce Blasi’s model, including his notions of integ-
rety and responsibility, which I contend, provide a straightforward
story about why we take a subset of moral judgments, what I call ‘here
and now’ ascriptions and assessments, to be necessarily motivating while
allowing that other types of moral judgments might motivate only con-
tingently. I also argue that the view I develop can handle the cases of the
amoralist and the akratic. Finally, I consider the implications that the view
might have for the debate between internalism and externalism.

II. Moral Judgments and the ‘Circumstances’ Requirement

The debate between internalism and externalism is usually presented
in one of two ways in the literature. The first is as a dispute over the
answer to the question: are moral judgments necessarily, or only contin-
gently, motivating? Internalists opt for necessity and externalists opt for
contingency. The second is as a dispute over the answer to the question:
can a belief, on its own, be sufficient to motivate, or is an additional
conative state – cognitive or non-cognitive – required? In response to this
question, internalists opt for sufficiency, while externalists opt for con-
anational necessity state. The contingency response to the first question
is taken, like the second question, to hinge on an additional conative state.

Internalists and externalists clearly have different intuitions regarding
moral judgments. Most individuals, however, seem to hold a mix of inter-
alistic and externalistic intuitions (Björklund et al. 2012, 131). This mix of
intuitions, I contend, calls on us to seriously consider the possibility that
there may not be a single answer to these questions that applies to all
moral judgments. In other words, might it be the case that some moral
judgments motivate necessarily while others motivate only contingently? In approaching this question, it is helpful first to distinguish between different types of moral judgments.

Philosophers often speak of ‘moral judgments’ without specifying exactly what constitutes one. This results in discussions that often slide between what we might think are actually different types of moral judgments. For instance, many philosophers in the debate between internalism and externalism often move between discussing judgments of the type ‘φ is right’ and those of the type ‘I ought to φ’, and they tend to treat both types of judgments as equally motivating.3 There are, however, many different types of judgments that could plausibly fall under the umbrella term ‘moral judgment’, and it seems important to be clear on what specific judgments are in question when trying to determine whether moral judgments are necessarily motivating.

‘Moral judgments’ could plausibly include: assessments of another person’s moral behaviour (e.g. ‘It was wrong of Mark David Chapman to kill John Lennon’); assessments of my own past behaviour (e.g. ‘I should have been more patient with my spouse yesterday’); assessments of how another individual could improve morally (e.g. ‘My neighbour should be more polite’); aspirational assessments of how I could improve morally (e.g. ‘I ought to be more courageous’); advisory assessments of what someone should do in a particular situation (e.g. ‘You should tell your friend the truth’); assessments of what I should do in a particular situation (e.g. ‘I ought to pay the fine for my overdue library book’); all-things-considered ascriptions of moral properties (e.g. ‘It is right to help the poor’ or ‘It is good to be generous’); as well as ascriptions of moral properties to particular actions I am to perform in particular situations (e.g. ‘It is right for me to fulfil my promise to my niece today’). This list is surely incomplete, but hopefully it serves to illustrate the diverse range of types of moral judgments.

The literature makes it obvious that claims regarding internalism and externalism are not intended to apply to all of the above kinds of moral judgments.

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moral judgments. For instance, assessments of other people’s behaviour are usually bracketed from the discussion. This makes sense. Given that the debate is about an individual’s motivation, moral judgments that have to do with other people may well be beyond the scope of concerns. Judgments that I make about you, or anyone else, often might fail to hook up with my own circumstances in such a way that we would expect them to motivate me, with or without an additional conative state. If a moral judgment is going to motivate necessarily, then it will fit the very bare hermeneutic task that concerns the requirement. I suspect that both the variety of moral judgments and the extent to which these judgments might fail to satisfy the circumstances requirement have been underestimated.

In the literature, the moral judgments in question are almost always presented as ‘I ought to φ’ or ‘φ is right’ and, as noted earlier, the two are treated as equally motivating. But in light of the variety of moral judgments listed above, one can see that this is extremely unhelpful. First of all, it is not clear that these judgments are the same kind of judgment. In fact, ‘I ought to φ’ and ‘φ is right’ each fail to specify a single kind of moral judgment. ‘To φ is right’ could be an all-things-considered ascription of a moral property. Or it could be shorthand for ‘φ is right for me to do in this situation’, that is, it could be an ascription of a moral property to a particular action I am to perform in a particular situation. But even that is ambiguous between situations I am merely contemplating – say, in an applied ethics course – and situations that I am actually in. ‘I ought to φ’ could be an aspirational assessment of how I could improve morally, or an assessment of what I should do in a particular situation, again, either a situation that I am merely contemplating or one that I am actually in. It is far from obvious, then, that these moral judgments can be assumed to be equivalent motivating.

These ambiguities are significant because moral judgments about other people may not be the only types of judgments that could fail to
satisfy the circumstances requirement. All-things-considered judgments, aspirational assessments, and hypothetical assessments might not always hook up with my own circumstances in such a way that one would expect them to motivate me, with or without an additional conative state. Take, for example, a case in an applied ethics course. Suppose I am a sincere utilitarian and, in considering the footbridge version of the trolley problem (Thomson 1976) in class one day, I conclude, ‘To push the large person off the bridge is right.’ Since I am sitting in a classroom, with no footbridge in sight, it is not implausible to think that my judgment may be far enough removed from my current situation such that the circumstances requirement fails to be satisfied. If this were the case, then all-things-considered judgments, aspirational assessments, and hypothetical assessments would be only contingently motivating, if they motivate at all. Whatever else may or may not be needed, the judgment itself will not be enough: it will also need to hook up to my circumstances in a particular way.

By contrast, some moral judgments are always hooked up to my circumstances in the requisite way, because I only make these kinds of judgments when I am – or at least believe I am – in a position to act, namely, ascriptions of a moral property to a particular action I am to perform in the particular situation I am currently in, as well as assessments of what I should do in the particular situation that I am currently in. Despite the fact that moral terms appear across a variety of types of judgments, these two – ascriptions of a moral property to a particular action I am to perform in the particular situation I am currently in, as well as assessments of what I should do in the particular situation that I am currently in – have a distinctive first-personal character that guarantees the satisfaction of the circumstances requirement. Thus it seems that if any moral judgments are going to be necessarily motivating, then those, which I shall call ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments, will be. And, indeed, it would seem that our internalist intuitions are strongest with regard to those kinds of moral judgments.

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Much like the philosophical debate between internalism and externalism, contemporary psychological work on moral motivation has tended to focus either on reasons or moral beliefs on the one hand, or on emotions or other affective states as the primary source of moral motivation on the other. Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory (1969) is probably the best-known example of the former, while Martin Hoffman's work on empathy (1992) and his distinction between 'cool' and 'hot' emotions (1977) are well-known examples of the latter. More recently, however, a number of psychologists have turned their attention to the role that moral identity might play in moral motivation. By far the most influential work in psychology on moral identity and motivation is that of Augusto Blasi.

There is, of course, a lot of interesting and important work on moral identity in both psychology and philosophy. Blasi's work, however, has direct relevance to our mix of internalist and externalist intuitions. In particular, I argue that the roles that responsibility and integrity — both technical terms for Blasi — play in his notion of identity-based motivation provide a straightforward way to see why 'here and now' ascriptions and assessments are necessarily motivating while other types of moral judgments motivate only contingently. In short, Blasi's model allows us to make sense of our mix of internalist and externalist intuitions.

Blasi understands moral identity as an aspect of self-identity and he sees moral identity as a significant dimension of individual difference (1984, 132). For one, moral or immoral contents might figure more or less centrally in individuals' self-identities. For example, some might take being compassionate to be a central feature of who they are; if they were to lose that quality, they would consider themselves to be radically altered. For others, by contrast, morality may not play much of a role at all in how they see themselves or go about their lives. And even those who do view morality as central to their self-identity will differ according to the specific contents that are taken as most central as well as according to
how those contents are organized. Some may prioritize fairness and justice, for instance, while others prioritize kindness or loyalty.

For Blasi, one's self-identity is constructed under the influence of reason (1984, 138). This yields a decidedly agentic view of the self (Hardy and Carlo 2005, 235-237): as individuals mature, they make choices regarding which contents should constitute their identity as well as how those contents are organized and prioritized. When it comes to moral identity, then, the idea is that individuals "[...] selectively and deliberately infuse moral values with personal importance by integrating them into their sense of self" (Hardy and Carlo 2005, 237). As a result of these choices, individuals begin to feel a greater sense of ownership of and responsibility for their own identity. The sense of ownership and responsibility, in turn, intensifies their desire to maintain their integrity.

Blasi places considerable emphasis on integrity and responsibility; however, these are technical terms for him. These two concepts are what, according to Blasi’s view, constitute moral identity to action.

These two concepts are closely related and derive their meaning from a view of moral action as an extension of the essential self into the domain of the possible, of what is not but needs to be, if the agent has to remain true to himself or herself. Responsibility, in this sense, involves the self in a sense of moral compulsion: integrity, instead, emphasizes the idea of moral self-consistency, of intactness and wholeness – all essential connotations of the self as a psychological organization (1984, 132).

Integrity, then, is understood as being and acting in ways that are consistent with one’s moral identity. Responsibility for Blasi is a sense of moral compulsion, the felt need to act so as to maintain one’s integrity. This notion of responsibility is seen perhaps most clearly in what Blasi calls ‘judgments of responsibility.’

Before one acts on a moral judgment, according to Blasi’s model, that judgment often goes through a judgment of responsibility. The idea is that, as Blasi explains, "[...] an action, evaluated as moral, is also judged to be strictly necessary for the individual" (1983, 199). There are a couple
of things to note here. First, we can see Blasi's understanding of responsibility as moral compulsion: a judgment of responsibility is an acknowledgment that I must do this action, whatever it is, if I am to maintain my integrity. And this is why these judgments are motivating: my very sense of self is at stake. If I fail to rise to the demands of my judgment of responsibility, then I am forced to confront the fact that I may not be the kind of person I think I am (Blasi 1983, 201). Furthermore, we see Blasi distinguishing judgments of responsibility from other moral judgments.

As he explains, "A judgment about what is good or right, even when applied to a concrete situation, remains abstract and intellectual if the individual does not relate it to himself and does not see himself as necessarily involved with both situation and action" (1983, 198). Judgments of responsibility are distinctive in that they relate the individual to the situation and potential action at hand, thereby motivating the individual to act in accordance with the judgment.

Since a judgment of responsibility is oriented towards the maintenance of one's integrity — "I must do this, if I am to maintain my integrity" — and integrity is self-consistency with one's moral identity, the criteria for judgments of responsibility derive from the individual's moral identity (Hardy and Carlo 2005, 235). If I identify as an honest person, for example, then I am likely to form a judgment of responsibility that I need to return the extra money when the cashier at the grocery store accidentally gives me too much change. On the other hand, I identify as a dishonest person — say, for instance, that I am a stereotypical used car salesman, and proud of it — then my judgment of responsibility will be quite different: of course I should keep the money.

According to Blasi's model, then, moral identity is one aspect of an individual's self-identity. As individuals mature, they make choices regarding which contents constitute their moral identity as well as how those contents are organized and prioritized. These choices increase their feelings of ownership and responsibility for their moral identity, which in turn increase their desire to maintain their integrity, that is, to be and to act in ways that
are consistent with their moral identity. This responsibility comes out most
distinctly in individuals’ judgments of responsibility, judgments that they must
do this action, whatever it may be, if they are to maintain their integrity.
These judgments of responsibility often accompany other types of moral
judgments. In relating individuals to the situation and potential action at
hand and putting individuals’ sense of self at risk, judgments of responsi-
bility motivate them to act in accordance with those judgments.

Much empirical work remains to be done on Blasi’s model. The work
that has been done on moral identity and motivation, however, is encourag-
ing. One well-known study of moral exemplars found that, while most adults
include some moral concern in their self-identity, the moral identity of moral
exemplars—individuals who exhibit exceptional moral commitment—figured
much more prominently in their self-identity than it does for the average adult
(Colby and Damon 1992). In a similar vein, studies of adolescent moral
exemplars found that they saw moral traits to define themselves more often
than their peers do (Blasi and Fegley 1995; Remer 2003). Although these
studies can only establish a correlation between exceptional, consistent moral
motivation and behavior and the centrality of one’s moral identity to one’s
self-identity, other findings support further aspects of Blasi’s model. For
instance, adolescent moral exemplars appear to have more complex and
agentic self-conceptions than their peers. (Maroko and Walker 2005), sup-
porting Blasi’s view of the maturation of moral identity. Furthermore, the
study of adult exemplars also found that they did not find it onerous to get
themselves to act morally; rather, it was a matter of felt neces-
sity, something they felt they had to do (Colby and Damon 1992). These
findings would seem to support Blasi’s notion of responsibility.

IV. ‘Here and Now’ Ascriptions and Assessments as Judgments of
Responsibility

Blasi distinguishes judgments of responsibility from other moral
judgments: judgments of responsibility are distinctive in that they relate
the individual to both the situation and potential action at hand. In so doing, judgments of responsibility are necessarily motivating: my very sense of self is at stake. I want to suggest that ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments are judgments of responsibility, in Blasi’s sense, and that this could explain why we take them to be necessarily motivating, while allowing that other types of moral judgements motivate only contingently. There are a few reasons to think it is plausible that ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments are judgments of responsibility.

Since they relate individuals to the situation and potential action at hand, individuals only make judgments of responsibility regarding the particular situations to which they find themselves at the time of the judgment formation. Like ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments, judgments of responsibility, as Blasi has defined them, are very much ‘here and now.’ Furthermore, individuals seem accountable to ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments in the same sort of way that one would expect with a judgment of responsibility. A judgment of responsibility demands some sort of response, acknowledgement, or action on my part. If I fail to rise to the demands of my judgment of responsibility, then I am faced with the fact that I must not be the kind of person I think I am (Blasi 1983, 201). ‘Here and now’ ascriptions and assessments likewise appear to place these kinds of demands upon the individual making the judgment. If I form the judgment, ‘I ought to φ here and now’ and then I fail to φ, I am immediately faced with the question why.

Finally, of the different kinds of moral judgements delineated at the beginning of this paper, judgments of responsibility would seem most similar to ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments. First of all, judgments of responsibility have an ‘I’ or ‘me’ component to them; this takes a number of kinds of moral judgments off the table. It is also clear that judgments of responsibility are not hypothetical or aspirational. Rather, judgments of responsibility have to do with me, as I am here and now. They are not looking toward how I used to be, how I wish I were, or how I hope to become; nor are they – implicitly or explicitly – evaluating
my identity in any way. Consider, by contrast, an aspirational judgment such as, ‘I ought to be more courageous’. Such a judgment is oriented towards me, as I hope to become, not as I am now. It also appears to be implicitly evaluative of my moral identity, recognizing a shortcoming in that identity. But with ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments, there is no stepping back from or outside of my moral identity. Both judgments of responsibility and ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments are concerned directly with me, as I am here and now.

If ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments are judgments of responsibility, then this could explain our mix of internalist and externalist intuitions. In putting one’s very sense of self at stake, judgments of responsibility are necessarily motivating. Moreover, we can see how fulfillment of the circumstances requirement may not be enough to ensure that a moral judgment motivates: there has to be a judgment that ties the individual to the situation and potential action at hand. For instance, situations in which individuals exhibit bystander apathy (Darley and Latané 1968) might be a case in which the circumstances requirement is fulfilled, and yet the individual fails to make a judgment of responsibility. One could imagine, for example, a bystander thinking to him- or herself, ‘This is exactly the kind of situation where someone should help that person out’, without feeling any motivation at all. Thus, a moral judgment is made, the circumstances requirement is fulfilled, yet there is no accompanying judgment of responsibility, and, hence, no motivation. The reason why so many moral judgments often appear to be motivating is that most of us, to some extent, identify with at least some moral values (Colby and Damon 1992). As a result, we often make judgments of responsibility, even if only implicitly, and many of the other types of moral judgments that we make that fulfill the circumstances requirement are likely to be accompanied by judgments of responsibility. Furthermore, one can see why changes in an individual’s moral judgments might bring about corresponding changes in that individual’s motivation. If, for example, my all-things-considered judgment about what is right...
changes, the way in which that judgment stands up to the criteria established by my moral identity is likely to change as well. This may result in a revised judgment of responsibility. Alternatively, the original judgment of responsibility might simply vanish if the revised judgment fails to meet those criteria.

Suppose, for instance, that benevolence plays a central role in my moral identity. I have just landed my first full-time job and want to set up an automatic deduction from my pay cheque to go to a worthwhile charity. I have heard a lot about charity X and it claims to do good things, so I form a moral judgment: ‘Charity X is a good organization’, which is then accompanied by a judgment of responsibility: ‘I ought to direct my paycheck deduction to charity X’. But suppose that later on it comes to light that charity X’s practices are actually quite dishonest and exploitative. After learning this, I revise my moral judgment about charity X: ‘Charity X is a bad organization’. My moral identity has not changed, however; I still very much see myself as a benevolent person. But benevolent people do not give to bad organizations. And so I revise my judgment of responsibility: ‘I ought not direct my pay cheque deduction to charity X’. I immediately call payroll and change my deduction instructions.

v. Addressing the Amoralist and the Akratic

Of course, although most of us identify with some moral values, there may be some individuals who fail to do so. A significant portion of the discussion between internalists and externalists focuses on the so-called ‘amoralist’, an individual who makes what at least appear to be moral judgments, all the while remaining entirely unmotivated. Internalists claim that such an individual is not really making moral judgments (e.g. Hare 1952; Smith 2007); externalists claim that the amoralist is, indeed, making moral judgments (e.g. Brink 1997). Much of the force of the case for the externalist seems to stem from the claim that an individual could make a moral judgment without being motivated in the least. Therefore, the argument goes, moral judgments cannot be necessarily motivating.
Once one acknowledges that not all types of moral judgments are equally motivating, however, the force of the argument fades away. One could easily grant, for example, that individuals—amoralist or otherwise—can make moral judgments without being motivated if the circumstances requirement is not fulfilled. If, as I have argued, the best candidates for our internalist intuitions are ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments, then it would be interesting to see if the amoralist can make those kinds of moral judgments without being motivated.

Due to the ambiguities discussed above, it is often difficult to tell which kinds of moral judgments tend to be attributed to the amoralist in the literature. Moreover, it is in the discussions of the amoralist that the moral judgments being considered often switch from the type ‘I ought to φ’ to ‘φ is right’ (e.g. Smith 2007). This becomes particularly significant when one turns to the empirical evidence offered in support of the amoralist’s ability to make moral judgments sans motivation. This evidence is drawn from psychological studies of psychopaths, who are generally acknowledged as our best real-life approximations of amoralists. Take, for example, individuals who have sustained injuries to their ventromedial cortex (hereafter ‘VM patients’) and who were subsequently studied by psychologists. “VM patients,” Adina Roskies notes in her summary of the clinical profile, “retain the declarative knowledge related to moral issues, and appear to be able to reason morally at a normal level. Significantly, their moral claims accord with those of normals” (2003, 57). The data used to reach this conclusion, however, are the results of Kohlberg’s moral reasoning test, or other presentations and discussions of hypothetical situations (Roskies 2003, 64 note 8). It is plausible to think, then, that the judgments made by the VM patients in these cases, even if first personal, fail to satisfy the circumstances requirement and are not ‘here and now’ ascriptions or assessments. They would not, therefore, provide evidence that these particular types of moral judgment fail to motivate necessarily.

But surely, one will point out, even the amoralist can utter the type of phrase, ‘I ought to φ here and now,’ and perhaps even do so without being.
motivated at all. Some have suggested that in such a case the amoralist is merely making judgments about what other people judge as right and wrong, and is not himself or herself making a moral judgment (Hare 1952). Rather, he or she is acting more like a reporter. Others have suggested that the amoralist tries to make moral judgments but fails, due to a lack of mastery of moral terms (Hare 1952). Interestingly, it is with the case of psychopaths that our intuitions tend to go externalist; most of us tend to think—pace the internalist position—that psychopaths succeed in making moral judgments despite their lack of motivation (Nichols 2004, chapter 3). The distinction between types of moral judgments together with Blasi’s model of identity-based motivation can allow us to respond to the question of the amoralist in a way that is consistent with those intuitions.

First, based on the view I have outlined here, there is no need to deny that the amoralist succeeds in making a moral judgment, even when uttering ‘I ought to φ here and now’. For instance, he or she might be making an aspirational or hypothetical type of moral judgment along the lines of, ‘If I were a good person, I ought to φ here and now’, or ‘If I cared about morality, I ought to φ here and now’. What does seem clear, however, is that the amoralist is not making a judgment of responsibility. This can be illustrated by comparing the moral, the immoral, and the amoral.

Moral individuals are a shining example of Blasi’s model. They have appropriated moral content into their moral identity, and have come to strongly identify as fair, caring, honest, generous, and so on. As argued above, it would seem that their sense of self is, indeed, at stake each and every time they ascribe a moral property to a particular action they are to perform in the particular situation they are currently in, or assess what they should do in the particular situation that they are currently in. The same can be said of the immoral; for immoral individuals have also appropriated moral—or, perhaps I should say, immoral—content into their moral identity. Suppose, for example, they strongly identify with the mantra ‘Look out for number one’. Once again, each and every time they form a ‘here and now’ ascription or assessment, their sense of self is at
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Are we really the type of person who looks out for number one? Since the standards for judgments of responsibility are set by the contents of one’s moral identity, however, the instances and contents of the judgments of responsibility made by the immoral person are likely to differ significantly from those of the moral individual. But sometimes an immoral person’s judgment of responsibility might look remarkably similar to that of a moral person. For example, an immoral person might decide in a given situation that ‘I ought to tell the truth now’. Of course, the reasons for which he or she makes such a decision – for instance, ‘because it will help my competitors in trouble’ – would not be the kinds of reasons one would expect from a moral person.

The amoralist, by contrast, does not really have much by way of a moral identity. Recall that Blasi’s model yields an agentic view of the self: forming a mature moral identity takes effort. One must choose to appropriate and identify with certain moral contents. Unlike the moral and the immoral, the amoral, it seems, has failed to do just that. Having never gone through this process of moral maturation, his or her moral identity remains immature, undeveloped. Or perhaps in some cases, such as the VMI patients discussed earlier, the amoralist – rather than not having ever gone through the process of identity maturation – simply loses access to his or her moral identity. Since they fail to see moral values as part of who they are, the amoral seem unlikely to make judgments of responsibility at all. Given the amoralist’s lack of moral identity, there is not much by way of criteria that could yield such a judgment.

If we return to the research done on VMI patients, the claim that the amoralist does not make judgments of responsibility becomes even more compelling. There might be good reason to think that VMI patients fail to make ‘here and now’ ascriptions or assessments when the circumstances requirement is fulfilled, that is, when they are actually in a position to act in a particular situation. Take, for instance, the case of Eliot, a VMI patient studied by neuropsychologist Antonio Damasio (2005) and one of the case studies examined by Roskies. Eliot displayed an advanced
ability to reason morally in the laboratory setting. Outside the lab, however, Eliot acted in a variety of morally dubious ways. The discrepancy between Eliot's laboratory and real-life performances, Damasio concludes, has to do with choice. In fact, Damasio speculates that, in real-life situations, Eliot might not really choose at all. Eliot himself, after a session in which he came up with various possible courses of action, commented, "And after all this, I still wouldn't know what to do!" (Damasio 2005, 45). Jonathon Koner and Costilla Fine reach a similar conclusion in reviewing studies on the moral reasoning abilities of psychopaths: "...indeed, we question whether they ever spontaneously engage in moral assessments of their own projected actions" (2008, 176). It seems plausible, then, that the individuals who best approximate real-life examples of amoralists simply do not make 'here and now' ascriptions and assessments. Perhaps what they do in more than acting on a whim. We can thus grant that the amoralist can make a variety of moral judgments, none of which are necessarily motivating. What they do not appear to make, however, are the necessarily motivating judgments of responsibility.

There is, however, another potential counter-example to my identification of 'here and now' ascriptions and assessments with judgments of responsibility, and that is the case of weakness of will. Do the akratic make 'here and now' ascriptions and assessments without being motivated? It is a matter of much debate as to what exactly is going on in cases of weakness of will (see Stroud 2014), a debate that I cannot presume to be able to settle here. But there are two plausible possibilities regarding the akratic that are consistent with 'here and now' ascriptions and assessments being judgments of responsibility and so necessarily motivating.

First, it might be the case that the akratic make 'here and now' ascriptions and assessments and in doing so, experience some degree of motivation that is overridden by other desires. In failing to follow through on their judgments of responsibility, the akratic are forced to face the fact that they have failed to live up to their sense of self. Alternatively, it might be that when the akratic judge 'I ought to φ' in cases where they wouldn't...
weakness of will, they, like the amoralist, are not making ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments, despite appearances. So, for example, my judgment, ‘I ought to pay the fine for my overdue library book’, might be accompanied by the thought, ‘I can always do it tomorrow’, and so is closer to an all-things-considered judgment like ‘It is good for me to pay my library fines (at some point in time)’, than it is to a here-and-now ‘I ought to go to the library and pay my fine’.

As with the amoralist, to deny that the akratic make ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments in particular situations is not to deny that they make moral judgments at all. And of course, I am not committing myself to the claim that all cases of weakness of will fall under only one of the above possibilities. Rather, it seems likely that the akratic experience instances of both, depending on the circumstances. Either way, then, it looks as though the view I am advancing here can accommodate the akratic while preserving the identification of ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments with necessarily motivating judgments of responsibility.

VI. Internalism and Externalism

We thus have a straightforward story to tell about motivation that accounts for our mix of internalist and externalist intuitions. Judgments of responsibility, that is, ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments, in putting our own moral identity at stake, are necessarily motivating. Other types of moral judgments, however, motivate only contingently. While this might make sense of our intuitions, it is not a view that fits neatly under either internalism or externalism.

Most internalists would resist restricting their view only to ‘here and now’ ascriptions and assessments (Roskies 2008, 95; Smith 2008, 209). But as we have seen, no one in the debate expects every moral judgment to be necessarily motivating, so any defensible version of internalism must allow that some moral judgments may fail to motivate. Many internalists allow for this kind of failure of motivation by advancing a conditional...
form of internalism. According to conditional internalism, an individual will necessarily be motivated by his or her moral judgments so long as he or she meets certain criteria. Perhaps the best-known version of conditional internalism is that of Michael Smith, who holds that an individual will be motivated by his or her moral judgments if he or she is practically rational (1994).

Interestingly, although Smith is explicit that his position is not restricted to moral judgments made in the circumstances to which the judgment pertains, he does formulate his position in terms of the situation at hand: “It is conceptually necessary that if an agent judges that she morally ought to φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to φ in C, or she is practically irrational.” (2008, 211). And indeed, it is those in-the-moment sorts of cases that really engage our internalist intuitions. I have presented here an alternative approach to Smith’s, one that, I think, gets to the heart of why it is we find a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation so compelling in those in-the-moment cases and that better accounts for the not-uncommon intuition that a failure to be motivated by a non-‘here and now’ moral judgment may not be a case of irrationality.

On the other hand, an externalist is likely to point out that Blasi’s notions of integrity and responsibility involve a desire to be and to act in ways that are consistent with one’s moral identity. Judgments of responsibility, therefore, look as though they require a conative state and so what I have proposed here might be characterized as an externalist position. The exact role that the desire for self-consistency plays in Blasi’s model is a big question that deserves more attention. But note that, however its role gets fleshed out, judgments of responsibility are not contingently motivating. Rather, if they get made, they are motivating. One might, of course, not make judgments of responsibility, or not make them very often. But in making a judgment of responsibility, one is necessarily motivated. I doubt that this is a position that externalists would be willing to take on board.
What I would like to suggest in closing is that attempting to isolate moral motivation in either belief or desire seems likely to leave us with an impoverished view of moral motivation. An individual’s moral identity is a complex psychological organization of beliefs, desires, and emotions. Perhaps, then, looking at this organization as a whole, rather than one or another particular component of it, will allow us to develop a more complete understanding of moral motivation. Such an approach would free the distinctive benefit of being able to accommodate our intuitions, rather than having to explain them away.12

Works Cited


Notes
1. I am, of course, drastically over-simplifying the range of internalist and externalist posi-
tions.
2. For instance, Connie Rosati does this (2008), as does Michael Smith (2007). The work of
Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine is an exception in the literature: they helpfully

distinguish between third, second, and first personal judgments, as well as between 'armchair' and 'in situ'
judgments (2008, 181). But even their taxonomy fails to distinguish between some of the types
of moral judgments I elaborate below.
3. Adina Roskies notes this explicitly: "[...] I recognize that the internalist is not committed
to saying that if I hold a moral belief that someone else ought to do
A, this entails that I am
motivated to do A." (2003, 53).
4. It is unclear whether my 'here and now' ascriptions and assessments are identical to Ken-
nett and Fine's first personal 'in situ' judgments. They define an 'in situ' judgment as "[...] what
should be done in these actual circumstances" (2008, 181). I suspect that my own, in situ
judgments could contain both 'here and now' ascriptions and assessments as well as aspirational
judgments.
5. For an overview of the literature, see Hardy and Carlo (2005).
6. Blasi himself is significantly influenced by Harry Frankfurt (1988), who approaches the
issue of motivation in variously different ways (for discussion, see Blasi 2005). For similarly influ-
enced work in philosophy of culture, see the work of Charles Taylor (1992). Other philosophical
positions have been meaningful work on identity in various philosophical contexts. For example, Donna
Korsgaard conceives of identity as agency, distinguishing various in situ which are performed
under a norm. Korsgaard argues that one's actions reflect one's identity (2014). In addition,
Michael Ridge argues that moral theories can make room for an agent's own identity (Ridge 2014). Other
psychological models of identity, which differ in their specific definitions, have been used in
social psychology. The social constructionists have posited that one's identity is determined by
social processes, and should be distinguished from one's in situ identity. It is unclear whether
such a position is beyond the scope of the article, but it shows the variety of the concept of
identity that I am interested in, as well as other work.
7. It is worth noting that this is consistent with the possibility that some individuals may
seem to be morally mature and yet may make two different moral decisions in this way. I discuss
this possibility in the conclusion of this paper.
8. Blasi does not seem to think that judgments of responsibility must always occur prior to
action, but that they often do, even if not explicitly (1983).
9. I say 'might,' because what exactly is going on in these situations has not yet, to the best
of my knowledge, been sorted out. It may be the case that judgments of responsibility are
made, but the motivation is not overriding.
10. For a critique of Roskies, see Kennett and Fine (2008). Although they argue that psy-
chopaths lack moral understanding, I tend to agree with Roskies that the evidence supports the
notion that these individuals are capable of moral reasoning (see Roskies 2008).
I am grateful to Jesse Prinz, Rosalind Hursthouse, Glen Pettigrove, Jonathan McKeown-Kenney, the audience at the 2012 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, and the anonymous reviewers from this journal for feedback on earlier versions of this article.